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I. INTRODUCTION
The drafters of revised Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC or Code) have a choice: to draft truly modern model
laws or to propose model dinosaurs that are unlikely to be adopted in
a majority of states. The UCC is a source of the basic law governing
contracts between consumers and commercial entities.1 The UCC is a
commercial code, but the commerce which it governs is not limited to
commerce between businesses.
Modem model articles must include standards and rules that will
operate fairly in transactions between consumers and commercial par-
ties. This will require reexamining and modifying rules that were orig-
inally drafted for the individually negotiated transaction between
commercial entities. Consumer contracts with commercial parties are
1. The National Retail Federation stated that Article 2 "governs nearly every retail
consumer sale, and has an effect on every commercial purchase as well." Letter from
Michael J. Altier, Vice President and General Counsel, National Retailers Federation, to




rarely individually negotiated, except for the price term for some
types of products, for example, cars. Consumers do not have the free-
dom to bargain for specific rights and remedies or for particular con-
tract terms. Sales representatives and loan agents generally lack the
power to alter a preprinted contract even if a consumer asks them to
do so. A modem model code would recognize that differences be-
tween the negotiated transaction and the mass market consumer
transaction call for different default rules, such as restrictions on
waiver, restrictions on contractual changes in the default rules, and
consumer protections appropriate to the transactions governed by the
particular article. A model dinosaur, by contrast, would continue to
treat consumer and commercial transactions identically in most cases.
It would also continue to assume that all transactions occur between
parties with bargaining power, access to legal counsel, similar informa-
tion, and reasonable alternatives to the contract terms being offered.
This piece will discuss some of the progress that has been made
toward making Article 2 a modem model act, identify a few areas
requiring further work, and then focus on ways in which the drafters
of Article 9 could bring it into conformity with some of the realities of
modem consumer transactions.
II. THE ARTICLE 2 DRAFrING EFFORT
A. Progress in Article 2
The current Article 2 Discussion Draft has made a good start on
the task of revising Code principles to fit the nonnegotiated consumer
transaction.2 For example, the current Discussion Draft codifies an
approach which recognizes the strong potential for unfair results from
2. U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2. SALES, PARTS 3, 4, 5 AND 6, § 2-318(e) (Discussion
Draft Feb. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Discussion Draft, Feb. 28, 1994]. Drafts are for discussion
purposes only until presented to, and finally approved by, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute
(ALI). Some of the concepts in the Article 2 draft will have received their first exposure to
NCCUSL at its summer 1994 meeting. The full draft, however, will not be read by the
Conference until 1995 or later. All drafts of Articles 2 or 9 cited herein contain the
disclaimer,
[t]he ideas and conclusions herein set forth, including drafts of proposed legisla-
tion, have not been passed upon by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commit-
tee, Reporters, or Commissioners. Proposed statutory language, if any, may not
be used to ascertain legislative meaning of any promulgated final law.
U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2. SALES, PARTS 1, 2, 3 AND 7. This discussion is intended to
reflect the direction of the drafters, based on this Author's observation of the work of the
drafting committees for Articles 2 and 9. The discussion of the direction that these com-
mittees may have taken on some issues is not intended to suggest that they have made final
November 1994]
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boilerplate disclaimers of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness. 3 The draft does this by requiring proof of true agreement to
terms purporting to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability
or the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose before such
disclaimers can be enforced.
The draft also eliminates the statute of frauds4 that, according to
attorneys who represent consumers, is used as a pleading hurdle by
commercial entities attempting to avoid obligations that might other-
wise have been created by the oral promises of their representatives.
B. Some Problem Areas in Article 2
1. Limitations on nonprivity warranty suits
In another potentially positive change, the Article 2 Discussion
Draft recognizes that a manufacturer who makes affirmations or
promises about its products in local, regional, or national advertising
should be held to those promises as express warranties to its ultimate
consumers.5 This proposal, in effect, recognizes that limitations on
vertical privity are outmoded. However, serious questions remain
about the scope of remedies that will be available to persons not in
privity. The Discussion Draft contains a proposal that would allow a
party not in privity to escape liability for consequential damages by
replacing the goods or refunding the price, in addition to paying any
decisions, nor that the Conference has endorsed any of the drafting committees' tentative
decisions.
3. U.C.C. § 2-318(e). Other protections addressing boilerplate contract language that
would have been desirable for consumers, however, were not added to the draft. For ex-
ample, the drafting committee had previously declined to adopt a proposal that a merger
clause in a standard form contract selling consumer goods would be inoperative against a
consumer. The drafting committee also rejected a motion that a merger clause in a stan-
dard form contract for consumer goods would be unenforceable without proof by clear and
convincing evidence that the consumer "understood and expressly agreed to" the clause.
U.C.C. REVISED ARTICLE 2. SALES, PARTS 1, 2, 3 AND 7, § 2-202, reporter's note at 11
(Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter Discussion Draft, Dec. 21, 1993].
Oral promises attempting to be disclaimed by a merger clause will be subject to the
rule of revised § 2-202. The draft makes it clear that in considering whether a writing is
intended to be final, complete, and exclusive, a court should consider all admissible evi-
dence-including evidence of prior oral or written agreements or representations. The
reporter's notes indicate that the section was designed to permit a court to deny operation
to the merger clause where there is "unfair surprise or no real assent." Discussion Draft,
Dec. 21, 1993, supra note 3, § 2-202, reporter's note at 11.
4. Discussion Draft, Dec. 21, 1993, supra note 3, § 2-201.
5. Discussion Draft, Feb. 28, 1994, supra note 2, § 2-313(c), at 2. For a complete dis-
cussion of this rule and related draft remedy sections, see Donald F. Clifford, Issues, An-
swers and Some Questions Relating to Revised 2-313, 2-316 and 2-318, 1994 COM. L. ANN.
(forthcoming Aug. 1994) (on fie with author).
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incidental damages.6 That provision had not yet been discussed by the
drafting committee as of July 1994. It is not clear whether the damage
limitation proposal would apply to personal injury claims, but it may
be that this result is not intended.7 Even if the proposed "refund or
replace" remedy is only a substitute for other remedies for economic
loss, it would reduce existing consumer rights in several major states.8
This proposed remedy restriction is unfair to consumers. Con-
sumers will have foreseeable consequential damages far less fre-
quently than commercial parties, and generally in far smaller amounts.
But even relatively small consequential damages can financially im-
pact a family. Suppose, for example, that a manufacturer of fire extin-
guishers advertises that its product is "best for all types of household
fires," when, in fact, that fire extinguisher is best suited to extinguish-
ing wood and cloth fires, and another type of extinguisher is better
suited to extinguishing kitchen grease firesf The consequential loss to
a consumer who purchases this product for the kitchen is quite fore-
seeable. If the extinguisher fails to put out a kitchen fire, the con-
sumer will have both damage from the fire itself, plus other
foreseeable consequential damages such as the cost of purchasing pre-
6. Discussion Draft, Feb. 28, 1994, supra note 2, § 2-313(c). It is also not clear
whether the substitute "refund or replace" remedy is intended to eliminate the ability to
seek direct damages. As presently drafted, the language suggests that all damages except
incidental damages would be eliminated. However, that language has not yet been dis-
cussed by the drafting committee. It is hard to believe that the drafters' intent would be to
permit incidental damages but eliminate direct damages. Perhaps the thought is that as a
result of the refund or replacement of the goods, there will be no further direct damages.
7. See, Clifford, supra note 5, § 2-318 III(B). Professor Clifford argues that as cur-
rently drafted, the § 2-719 ban excluding consequential damages for personal injury in con-
sumer contracts may not override the § 2-318(d)(2) substitute remedy because: (1) the
injured party may not be in a "consumer contract" with the offending party; and (2) the
exclusion of consequentials in § 2-318(d)(2) is statutory, not contractual. Therefore, the
prohibition in § 2-719 against contractual exclusion of personal injury consequential dam-
ages would not restrict the statutory exclusion of personal injury consequentials in § 2-
318(d)(2). Professor Clifford points out that the drafting committee will have to modify
§ 2-318(d)(2) if it decides to apply the intent of the § 2-719 ban to the statutory refund or
replace mechanism. Id.
8. See, e.g., Letter from Michael M. Greenfield, Professor of Law, Washington Uni-
versity in St. Louis Law School, to Richard E. Spiedel, Professor of Law, Northwestern
University Law School (Feb. 1, 1994) (on file with author) (stating that restriction on con-
sequential damages when party not in privity has cured eliminates existing consumer rights
to seek consequential damages from party not in privity in at least five states-including
major population centers such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas).
9. See Fire Extinguishers: Rating the Flame Fighters, CONSUMER RaP., May 1994, at
340 (recommending different type of fire extinguisher for so-called type B and C fires-
kitchen and electrical fires-than for so-called type A fires-wood, cloth, or upholstery
fires).
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pared food for his or her family while waiting for the damage to the
kitchen to be repaired. In some states, the fire damage itself also may
be consequential. The manufacturer should not be able to avoid re-
sponsibility for these damages by simply supplying another fire
extinguisher.
This problem could be addressed by eliminating the restriction on
consequential damages in section 2-318(d)(2) for transactions involv-
ing consumer goods. A narrower solution would be to restrict the lim-
itation in section 2-318(d)(2) to consequential damages which are lost
profits. This remedy could be used either in all cases or just in those
cases involving consumer goods. This would permit consumers to se-
cure foreseeable consequential damages such as the fire damage and
the cost of living without a kitchen during repairs, while avoiding ex-
tended litigation about whether these damages should be character-
ized as direct, incidental, or consequential. The narrower restriction
limited to lost profits, rather than to all consequential damages, would
allow the refund or replace remedy to displace the "lost profit" type
of consequential damages but not other more predictable types of
consequential damages.
2. Failure to include an attorneys fees provision in the
unconscionability section
The current Article 2 draft also retreats from a consumer protec-
tion position taken by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in Article 2A. It fails to include an
attorneys fees provision similar to section 2A-108(4). That section re-
quires a court to award attorneys fees to a prevailing consumer claim-
ing and proving unconscionability with respect to a consumer lease. It
permits attorneys fees to be awarded against a losing consumer only if
the consumer has brought or maintained a groundless action. Provi-
sions for attorneys fees to prevailing consumers are a widely used
means to encourage enforcement of statutory standards of conduct. 10
10. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, .15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) (1988); Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, id. § 1691e(d) (1988) (discussing application of attorneys fees to
individual and class actions, to actual and punitive damages, and to equitable and declara-
tory relief); Truth in Lending Act (subchapter I-Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure, Part
B-Credit Transactions), id. § 1640(a)(3) (1988), and Part E-Consumer Leases id.
§ 1667d (1988); Fair Credit Reporting Act, id. § 1681n(3) (1988) (defining willful conduct),
and § 16810(2) (defining negligent conduct); California Credit Services Act of 1984, CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1789.21 (,Vest 1994); California Robbins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections
Practices Act, CAt. Civ. CoDE § 1788.30(c) (West 1985); New York Fair Credit Reporting
Act, N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 380 (McKinney 1988); Wisconsin Consumer Act, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 425.308 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993).
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Where such provisions also permit a creditor or other commercial
party to recover attorneys fees, they are similar to section 2A-108 in
that they limit fee awards against a consumer to cases brought or
maintained in bad faith.1
This type of attorneys fees provision addresses, in small measure,
some of the inherent litigation advantage a commercial entity may
have over an individual. A business may have an interest in prevailing
in the particular case which far exceeds the amount of money at stake
in that case, because it has engaged or wishes to engage in the chal-
lenged practice with other customers. Because a large business may
have counsel on staff, it may more readily engage in litigation. An
attorneys fees provision for prevailing consumers, such as that found
in section 2A-108(4), acts to partially level this tilt in the playing field.
Finally, although the important standard of unconscionability in
the inducement in section 2A-108 has been included in the Article 2
Discussion Draft, the portion of section 2A-108 dealing with uncon-
scionable collection activities was excised by the drafting committee.
These and many issues for consumers in Article 2 have been well
covered by other authors.12 Although Article 2 still raises many seri-
ous and important issues for consumers, the drafting committee ap-
pears to have made a fundamental decision to recognize that the
Article covers not only individually bargained for transactions, but
also millions of nonnegotiated transactions involving ordinary con-
sumers. The drafting committee appears to be evaluating proposed
rules in light of their impact on ordinary consumers, an approach that
is necessary to create a draft that will provide for a fair and balanced
statute. Only such a draft will be a modern model code rather than a
model dinosaur.
III. THE NEED TO MODERNIZE ARTICLE 9
A. The Article 9 Revision Effort's Initial Focus Has Been
Improvements for Creditors
The Article 9 drafting process is newer than the Article 2 process.
It remains to be seen whether that process will result in a fair and
balanced statute. The study committee report states that "problems
11. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); California Rob-
bins-Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.30(c).
12. See, e.g., Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 35
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1565 (1994); Yvonne W. Rosmarin, Customers-R-Us: A Reality in
the U.C.C. Article 2 Revision Process, 35 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 1593 (1994); Clifford,
supra note 5.
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relating to business credit transactions were the principal impetus for
the Committee's study, and its recommendations reflect these con-
cerns." 13 However, the study committee report also recognizes that
more work is needed on the impact on consumers of a variety of its
proposals.' 4
The study committee's recommendations include specific propos-
als to increase creditor's rights-for example, adopting the "rebutta-
ble presumption" rule for commercial transactions where there is a
defect in the disposition of the collateral.' 5 This rule would signifi-
cantly increase creditors' rights in the minority of states which now
use the "absolute bar" rule for both commercial and consumer trans-
actions. 6 To its credit, the study committee did not recommend im-
posing the rebuttable presumption test in transactions where the
collateral is consumer goods. Instead, it recommended that a secured
party who fails to comply with Part 5 be barred from recovering a
deficiency in consumer transactions.' 7
Another study committee recommendation aimed at increasing
creditor rights would eliminate the requirement of possession of col-
lateral to accomplish strict foreclosure under section 9-505.18 The
study committee also suggested revisions to Part 5, or to its official
comments, which would deny that delay in disposition of collateral
could be a constructive strict foreclosure.' 9
13. PEmANENr EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GRoup, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT 3 n.9 (Dec. 1, 1992) [hereinaf-
ter STUDY GROUP REPORT].
14. Id. In addition, the chair of the Article 9 Drafting Committee has actively invited
consumer groups and advocates to participate in the drafting process. Id. Unfortunately,
most groups representing consumers are simply not financially equipped to accept an invi-
tation to participate in a national, multiyear effort on a volunteer basis.
15. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 13, at 37. The rebuttable presumption rule
provides that the noncomplying secured party is barred from recovering a deficiency unless
it overcomes a rebuttable presumption that compliance with Part 5 would have yielded an
amount sufficient to satisfy the secured debt. Id. at 199-201. See generally Fred H. Miller,
The Revision of UCC Article 9, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REp. 257,258 (1993) (summarizing
study committee's recommendations).
16. The absolute bar rule provides that the noncomplying party is absolutely barred
from recovering deficiency. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 13, at 201.
17. Id.
18. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 13, at 41. The current draft section implement-
ing this recommendation would do so only for commercial collateral. UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE REVISED ARTIcLE 9, PART 5. DEFAULT (WITH SECrION 9-105) § 9-505
(Discussion Draft Feb. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Discussion Draft, Feb. 8, 1994].
19. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 13, at 42. To the credit of the drafters, the draft
goes in the opposite direction for consumer collateral, expressly recognizing constructive
strict foreclosure. Discussion Draft, Feb. 8, 1994, supra note 18, at 35-36, reporter's note.
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The published reports on the drafting committee's work to date
suggests that it is providing a-number of increased rights to creditors.
One commentator has suggested that these rights would. include al-
lowing "pre-default waivers of creditor misbehavior under Article
9."2 Another right for creditors which appears likely to be added to
the draft is a change in section 9-502 to permit a secured creditor to
enforce all rights of its debtor against the account debtor rather than
simply the right to make collections or take control of the proceeds.21
These rights would then be available without any provision creating
them in the security agreement. The drafting committee is also dis-
cussing a safe harbor form of notice for creditors disposing of
collateral.22
B. Nature of Improvements Being Sought in Article 9 for
Consumers
Despite the initial focus on creditors' issues, there are many im-
provements required to make Article 9 better for consumers,
including:
(1) a standard of commercial reasonableness to promote crediting of
at least the full wholesale value of the goods against any potential
deficiency;
(2) adoption of the absolute bar rule in transactions for a consumer
purpose or transactions involving consumer goods or intangibles as
security;23
(3) statutory damages to work in conjunction with an absolute bar
rule to deter violations of Article 9 disposition rules;
(4) attorneys fees to prevailing consumers who enforce their Article 9
rights;
(5) a right to cure prior to repossession except in extraordinary
circumstances;
(6) restrictions on pre- and post-default waivers by consumers;24
20. Article 9 Drafting Committee Holds Second Meeting in Boston, CLARES' SECURED
TRANSACTIONS MONTHLY, May 1994, at 1, 6-7. This would not apply to the guarantor who
provides a lien on its own property as collateral.
21. Id.
22. Discussion Draft, Feb. 8, 1994, supra note 18, § 9-504.
23. This was recommended by the Study Committee, STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra
note 13, at 37.
24. The present draft recognizes that these should be restrictions on waiver in secured
transactions where a consumer is a party. See Discussion Draft, Feb. 8, 1994, supra note
18, § 9-501(c).
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(7) disclosure of the manner of calculating a deficiency preceding or
accompanying attempts to collect it;
(8) a restriction on the taking of nonpurchase money consumer goods
collateral which lacks significant resale value;z5
(9) restrictions on the amount awardable under attorneys fee clauses
favoring secured parties; and
(10) the addition of an objective standard of good faith for Article
9.26 Consumer advocates are also seeking to restrict the expansion of
Article 9 to intangible assets held by consumers such as their deposit
accounts, insurance claims, and tort claims.27
Overlying these issues is the definition of the type of transaction
to which any "consumer transaction" rules in revised Article 9 will
apply. The reporters initially suggested a "menu" approach in which
each state would choose from a series of factors such as whether the
collateral is consumer goods, the dollar amount of the transaction, and
perhaps other factors. A menu approach sacrifices the basic goal of
uniformity and creates serious choice of law issues. It also creates a
risk that consumer transaction rules could be eviscerated on a state by
state basis. This evisceration could occur by manipulating the allowa-
ble factors in the consumer transaction definition to minimize the
scope of the consumer transaction provisions. These problems and
the serious difficulties with limitations by dollar amount and by sub-
25. This is a subtle issue. The purpose of collateral is to provide something of value
that could be sold to repay all or part of a debt. In small consumer loans, however, there
have been some lenders who have taken security interests in items of importance to con-
sumers, even though those items have virtually no resale value. These items tend to be
things commonly found and used in the home, such as used stereos, VCRs, or TV sets. The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Credit Practices Rule does not effectively forbid this
practice. The Rule forbids taking a nonpurchase money security interest in household
goods, but it defines household goods to exclude home electronic equipment, except for
one radio and one TV, and to exclude personal jewelry, except wedding rings. FTC Credit
Practices Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444 (1994).
The only reason for a creditor to take a nonpurchase money security interest in some-
thing which has little or no resale value is to use the threat of taking away the item as a
"club" in collection activities. This illegitimate use should not be permitted by Article 9.
26. The study committee recommended that the drafting committee "give serious con-
sideration to revising the definition of good faith in section 1-201(19) as applied to Article
9 by adding 'the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing' to the
current standard of honesty in fact." STUDY GRoUP REPoRT, supra note 14, at 248 (citing
U.C.C. §§ 2-103(b), 2A-103(3), 3-103(a)(4), 4-104(c), 4A-105(a)(6)).
27. This issue, and several of the other issues mentioned here but not fully explored,
are discussed in Gail K. Hillebrand, The Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Issues for Consumers, 27 UCC L.J. 179 (Fall 1994) [hereinafter Hillebrand, The
Revision of Article 9].
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type of collateral within the general category of consumer goods have
been discussed in detail elsewhere.'
This essay will discuss two important ways to bring balance and
fairness to Article 9. The first way is to overhaul or replace the "com-
mercial reasonableness" standard for measuring allowable deficien-
cies after disposition of security. The second is to include some of the
concepts from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
IV. THE NEED TO OVERHAUL OR REPLACE THE COMMERCIAL
REASONABLENESS STANDARD
A. Failure to Ensure Reasonable Credit Against Debts for the Value
of Repossessed or Surrendered Collateral
The commercial reasonableness standard has been a failure for
consumers. It has not ensured that consumers will receive a credit on
the debt of anywhere near the amount of even the wholesale value of
the collateral.2 9 Consumer advocates report that at the sale of repos-
sessed cars,, they see bids that are much lower than the value of the
car. They also report that it is extremely rare, if not entirely unknown,
for even the wholesale value of a car to be bid at a dealer auction.
30
For example, in Southern California a 1988 Volkswagen Jetta was
sold at a disposition sale by a creditor for $3950. The wholesale "Blue
Book" value for that Jetta was $5175.31 The retail Blue Book value
was $7500. Because of the low amount credited from the sale, this
Southern California consumer owed a deficiency balance of $4654.
A consumer from Northern California surrendered a car to the
lender. In March 1994 the lender sent a notice of deficiency balance
informing the consumer that the 1989 Nissan Maxima had been sold
for $5600. The wholesale Blue Book value for that make and model
year car was $8075 to $8750, depending on the exact model. The retail
Blue Book value was $11,600 to $12,450.
An even more extreme example of a low amount credited to a
debt after a disposition sale involves a mobile home owner in South-
28. Id.
29. The same criticism has been made of its operation as applied to commercial debt-
ors. Donald J. Rapson, Repurchase (of Collateral?) Agreements and the Larger Issue of
Deficiency Actions: What Does Section 9-504(5) Mean?, 29 IDAHo L. Rlv. 649 (1993).
30. The dealer auction is a widely used means of disposing of a repossessed or surren-
dered vehicle.
31. The KELLEY BLUE Boor is a private guidebook to automobiles in the western
region. It lists the wholesale and suggested retail values of cars by year, make, and model.
The book is published at two-month intervals.
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ern California. The consumer had paid $44,000 for a three bedroom,
two bath Skyline mobile home, in 1987. The consumer surrendered
the home to the bank lender in January 1993. The bank took one year
to sell the mobile home, incurring $6000 in mobile home space rental.
Finally in May 1994, in response to telephone inquiries, the bank in-
formed the consumer that the home had been sold for $2000. Not
only did the bank credit the consumer a mere $2000 for a three-bed-
room mobile home, it also sought an additional $6000 for mobile
home space rental during the year between the consumer's surrender
and the bank's sale. The bank is seeking payment of approximately
$40,000 from this consumer and a cosigning relative.32
These examples of disposition sales that failed to return anything
approaching the real value of the collateral are not isolated horror
stories. Published and unpublished studies show that these individual
consumer stories are examples of the commercial reasonableness stan-
dard's long-standing and continuing failure to ensure that sales are
conducted in a manner that results in a credit of even the full whole-
sale value of repossessed vehicles.
1. Published studies show debtors do not receive the full retail or
wholesale value as a credit after a disposition sale
Studies of collateral sales in the District of Columbia in 1970 and
in Connecticut in the late 1960s showed that creditors disposed of au-
tomobile collateral for only 71% to 81% of its wholesale value.33 The
Connecticut study reported that repossessed or surrendered cars were
32. One idea that is sometimes discussed in connection with Article 9 is permitting
consumers to bid of their former property at the post-repossession sale. This idea is usu-
ally dismissed on the ground that if a consumer could not afford to make the loan pay-
ments, he or she certainly could not afford to buy outright at the sale. This example,
however, shows that when sale values are low, the consumer, and particularly any cosigner
for the consumer, would be much better off bidding and purchasing at the sale. In the
mobile home example, the consumer's relative who cosigned for the original loan, faces the
bank's attempt to collect $40,000. If the relative had known of and bid at the sale, he or
she could have chosen to pay $2000, and at least acquired ownership of the mobile home
for which he or she now owes this large debt. Allowing the cosigner or other individual
guarantor to bid at the foreclosure sale would not hurt the lender. Regardless of who bids,
the lender is paid the same amount-or perhaps more-if the presence of an outsider
willing to bid drives up the price.
33. Philip Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Reposses-
sion and Resale, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20,33 (1969) [hereinafter Shuchman, Profit on Default];
Philip Shuchman, Condition and Value of Repossessed Automobiles, 21 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 15, 26 (1979); Martin B. White, Consumer Repossessions and Deficiencies: New Per-
spectives from New Data, 23 B.C. L. Rnv. 385, 395, 399 (1982); John C. Firmin & Robert
Simpson, Note, Business as Usua" An Empirical Study of Automobile Deficiency Judgment
Suits in the District of Columbia, 3 CoNN. L. REv. 511, 516-21 (1971).
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sold at disposition sales for an average of 51% of their retail value and
71% of wholesale value. These sales establish the amount to be
credited to the consumer's debt.3 4 The very same cars that brought
51% of retail at the disposition sale were then resold three to five
months later for 92% of retail value.35 In the Connecticut study, Pro-
fessor Shuchman also described some disposition sales where the
identical car was sold at a second sale for two-and-a-half to three-and-
a-half times more than the price it brought at the sale which estab-
lished the amount to be credited against the deficiency.
3 6
In the District of Columbia study, Firmin and Simpson reviewed
data from 284 auto deficiency cases brought by dealerships, finance
companies, and banks located in the District of Columbia, Maryland,
and Virginia.37 In 106 of these cases, they were able to trace the car
past the disposition sale, or first resale, to the next time it was sold.
3 8
Firmin and Simpson found that according to values published by the
National Automobile Dealers Association, the average price paid at
the first resale-the one that established the amount to be credited
against the debt-was only 62% of retail and 81% of wholesale. The
prices paid on the second resale-which benefits only the first buyer
and not the debtor-averaged 110% of retail.39
34. Shuchman, Profit on Default, supra note 33, at 23 (citing CorN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-98(F) (1960)).
35. Id. at 31-33. The Firmin & Simpson study also shows that these same cars are sold
for their retail market value on the second resale. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 33, at
518, 520. The first resale (the disposition sale) is generally a private sale open only to
automobile dealers. The second resale, conducted by car dealers who were purchasers at
the disposition sale, results in the highest possible price, because it is generally public, well
advertised, and takes place on a dealer's car lot designed to attract a large number of
buyers. Id. at 519-20.
36. Shuchman, Profit on Default, supra note 33, at 26-27.
37. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 33, at 517 n.34. To locate suits seeking deficiencies,
Shuchman, and Firmin & Simpson, first examined the police blotter containing a list of all
automobile repossessions reported to the police, thus identifying the most active reposses-
sors, who in turn are likely plaintiffs in deficiency judgment suits. Id. at 532-33. They then
searched the municipal court's plaintiff index for those agencies identified in order to
gather all deficiency judgment suits filed. Id.; Shuchman, Profit on Default, supra note 33,
at 57, 58. One drawback to the police blotter-search method is that voluntary surrenders in
lieu of repossession would not be reported to the police. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 33,
at 533.
38. Firmin & Simpson obtained the second retail price by checking the title certificate
of the purchaser at the second resale. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 33, at 534. In the
District of Columbia, where the study took place, the authors used the automobile's serial
number to obtain access to the application for title, which must be filed by any individual
who registers a newly acquired car in the District of Columbia. This application contains
the price paid for the vehicle. Id.
39. Id. at 520.
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Another study, by Corenswet, looked at 200 deficiency suits filed
in Alameda County, California, between 1971 and 1973.40 Corenswet
found that the amount credited to the debtors from sales of surren-
dered or repossessed vehicles averaged 64% of the vehicle's retail
Blue Book value and 84% of its wholesale Blue Book value. This
California study found that auto dealers paid significantly less than
individuals when buying at disposition sales. Dealers paid only 50%
of retail Blue Book while individuals paid 86% of retail Blue Book.
41
This disparity existed whether the cars being sold were new or used.
Dealers purchased new cars at 61% of retail while those sold to indi-
viduals brought 95% of retail.4' Used cars brought 50% of retail
when sold to dealers and 75% when sold to individuals.43 Corenswet
also found that out of 200 complaints for deficiency judgments, about
20% of the deficiencies would have been eliminated if the car had
been sold for its wholesale value.44 In those cases, the average dispo-
sition sale price was about $700 below wholesale.45
2. Recent work shows that the problem of low values at
disposition sales has persisted
The West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union has per-
formed new research showing that low values on disposition sales of
automobile collateral is a continuing problem.46 This research showed
that repossessed or surrendered automobiles were still sold for much
less than either their wholesale or retail market values. The West
Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union examined court files in
suits for deficiency judgments filed over a two-year period in Oakland,
California. These court files revealed prices for automobile disposi-
40. Ellen B. Corenswet, Note, I Can Get it For You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem
of Automobile Deficiency Judgments, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (1975). Corenswet, who
conducted her study in California, was not able to obtain second sale prices because she
was not able to locate second purchasers. Id. at 1084. Within their jurisdictions, many
state departments of motor vehicles retain records of all sales of a vehicle. California,
however, retains information only about a vehicle's most recent transfer. Id. at 1084 n.15.
41. Id. at 1086.
42. Id. at 1086-87.
43. Id. at 1087.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1086-88.
46. Thipphavone Phabmixay, Fellow for Economic Justice, performed the research at
the West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union in June and July of 1994. Seventy
automobile deficiency suits were reviewed, but the number was reduced to 50 cases due to
incomplete court records. In those cases, the suit was dismissed before filing because of
the creditor's memorandum describing the vehicle and the sale, or because the automobile
was a make or model not included in the Blue Book.
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tions which averaged only 53% of the Blue Book retail value and 73%
of the Blue Book wholesale value. In only one of fifty cases did resale
price equal or exceed the Blue Book retail value; and in only eight of
fifty cases did resale prices equal or exceed the Blue Book wholesale
value. The low prices at these disposition sales cannot be attributed to
the cars' condition. The creditors characterized the vehicle's condi-
tion as average or good on a court-required report in forty-seven of
the fifty cases in the sample.
Consumers Union obtained these results after examining infor-
mation from court files of over fifty automobile deficiency judgment
suits filed in the Oakland Municipal Court from January 1992 to May
1994. Consumers Union's researcher compared the amounts paid at
those sales to Blue Book wholesale and resale used car values. The
1994 study by the West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union
was modeled after the Corenswet study published in 1975.47 Consum-
ers Union examined deficiency suits from the same city, in the same
court, and for the same length of time as those analyzed by Coren-
swet.48 Consumers Union's research shows results quite similar to
those in the same city twenty years earlier: Automobile collateral dis-
positions returned significantly less than both the retail and wholesale
value of the vehicles.
The following table compares the results reached by Shuchman,
Firmin and Simpson, and Corenswet, with the results of the more re-
cent work by the West Coast Regional Office of Consumers Union:
47. Corenswet, supra note 40, at 1084-85.
48. Consumers Union's methodology was as follows: First, the researcher examined
the plaintiff index for the names of all automobile dealers, finance companies, and collec-
tion agencies that brought suit within the first five months of 1994, thus identifying the
entities that brought the most automobile deficiency suits in this period. All automobile
deficiency cases brought in this period were brought by one automobile finance company.
After identifying the party most likely to sue, Consumers Union's researcher then looked
at all suits filed by that party from January 1992 to May 1994. In all, the research uncov-
ered over 70 automobile deficiency judgment suits in the Oakland Municipal Court. Each
file was examined for the following information: (1) the year, make, model, and vehicle
identification number of the automobile; (2) the condition of the automobile as described
by the creditor; (3) the dealer and finance company involved in the transaction; (4) the
date of the sale; (5) the identity of the buyer, (6) the resale price; and (7) the date of suit.
The researcher then compared resale price to the Blue Book wholesale and retail values of
each car on the date of resale. Next the percentage of retail value and wholesale value
realized upon resale were calculated.
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Percent of Value Obtained
First Resale Second Resale
(Distribution
Sale)
Study Year - Retail Wholesale Second Retail
Shuchman 1969 51% 71% 92%
Firmin & Simpson 1971 62% 81% 110%
Corenswet 1975 64% 84% n/a
Consumers Union 1994 53% 73% n/a
The studies in the District of Columbia, Connecticut, and
Oakland, California, identified the problem more than twenty years
ago. That problem appears to be even worse today in Oakland. In
1975, Corenswet reported that automobile collateral was disposed of
for an average of 64% of its retail value and 84% of its wholesale
value. Consumers Union found in 1994 that automobiles serving as
collateral were sold for 53% of their retail value and 73% of their
wholesale value.
3. Possible reasons for low values on disposition sales
These published studies and the newer data show that the Article
9 standard of commercial reasonableness has not resulted in sales that
provide consumers with credit for the true value of the collateral sur-
rendered or lost to repossession. It may seem surprising that a credi-
tor would willingly sell an item for less than its full wholesale value.
However, auto financiers may have business arrangements that insu-
late them from the ill effects of low sale prices. Creditors who
purchase notes from automobile dealers often require the auto dealers
to compensate them for losses suffered when car buyers default on
loans the dealer originated.4 9 In addition, a creditor may have an in-
centive other than minimizing the deficiency when it sells a repos-
sessed car or other consumer good. The creditor may wish to sell
promptly even if few people attend an auction sale. There may be
other business relationships between the creditor and the buyer of the
collateral-such as a car dealer-that make a low price beneficial to
49. David B. McMahon, Commercially Reasonable Sales and Deficiency Judgments,
Under UCC Article 9: An Analysis of Revision Proposals, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP.
(forthcoming 1994); Shuchman, Profit on Default, supra note 33, at 24-26; Corenswet,
supra note 40, at 1081-82. The structure of one such reserve account is discussed in the
Amended Answer and Counterclaim, National Bank of Commerce v. Smith, (Kanawha




both. For example, the financing institution may be purchasing large
amounts of automobile paper from a car dealer and may desire to
continue that arrangement.5 0
There could also be an unreasonably low value at a sale simply
because a custom and practice now exists in which everyone knows
that only dealers will be bidding. Therefore, it is not necessary to ap-
proach the full wholesale value in order to buy the car at such a sale.
B. Two Solutions to the Problem of Low Values Credited After
Post-Repossession Sales
1. A fair value credit rule
There are two practical ways to address the problem of low values
at sales after repossession or surrender. The best approach, however,
is to require any creditor who seeks to collect a deficiency to first
credit against the debt at least the fair value of the goods, at the time
of repossession or surrender, less necessary costs of maintenance and
sale of the goods.51 It is easy to measure fair value for automobiles,
which are the most common type of consumer collateral involving po-
tentially large deficiencies. Creditors could be given certainty with a
presumption that the fair value would be the Blue Book value for that
make, model, and year of car in average condition. An exception to
this general safe harbor would permit an even lower value if the credi-
tor proves in court that the car was in especially poor condition.
A fair value credit approach, with implementing presumptions,
has many strengths. First, it is consistent with reasonable consumer
expectations. Consumers who surrender vehicles on request from
creditors often think that the surrender unwinds the transaction and
that there will be no deficiency. However, to the extent that the sur-
rendering consumer or one suffering repossession expects a defi-
ciency, common sense suggests that the consumer expects to be
credited with the full value of the repossessed or surrendered collat-
eral, not with just a fraction of its wholesale value. Second, a rule
requiring credit for the fair value of consumer goods collateral would
leave creditors free to choose how to sell the goods. The creditor
could choose whether to (1) maximize the value secured at the sale, or
(2) accept a lower price in order to maximize convenience or to foster
50. The Washington, D.C., study found that in 71% of the cases the creditor sold the
car at the disposition sale to the same dealer that had sold the repossessed car to the
consumer in the first place. Firmin & Simpson, supra note 33, at 517.
51. For a more complete discussion of a formula that could be used to implement this
suggestion, see McMahon, supra note 49, at 30.
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business relationships with third parties. In either case, the consumer
would receive the same amount of credit against the debt. Third, the
use of implementing presumptions tied to prices published by in-
dependent third parties could provide certainty for creditors.
2. An antideficiency rule for consumer debts secured by nonluxury
goods collateral
Another approach to the problem of the failure of the commer-
cial reasonableness standard is to adopt a simple antideficiency rule
for most secured consumer transactions. Such a rule could apply to all
deficiencies on debts secured by consumer goods, perhaps with a "lux-
ury goods" exception.
An antideficiency rule would be a simpler way to ensure that un-
fair deficiencies are not pursued against consumers. Such a rule
would be overbroad only in the rare case in which the creditor secures
the fair value for consumer goods collateral. However, the data from
the late 1960s to the present shows that creditors regularly dispose of
collateral for significantly less than both the wholesale and retail
value.52
The dollar limit, if any, to be chosen in implementing an an-
tideficiency rule in consumer transactions is a delicate question. Some
suggest that a dollar ceiling should be adopted because affluent con-
sumers who can purchase-for example, a yacht or a Jaguar-are less
deserving of protection than other consumers. A high dollar ceiling,
such as $100,000, could eliminate such cases.
A more traditional approach to the issue of what debts should be
covered by an antideficiency rule for consumer transactions would be
to pick some number that is somewhat higher than the probable defi-
ciency for most consumers.53 Unfortunately, this approach can lead to
a woefully inadequate dollar ceiling in an act with a long lifespan. The
revisions to Article 9 probably will be promulgated in 1996 or 1997
52. See supra part IV.A.1-2.
53. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) antideficiency provision provides
that a consumer is not liable for a deficiency where: (1) the collateral was part of a con-
sumer credit sale; or (2) the lender is subject to claims and defenses because it has made a
consumer loan enabling the consumer to buy or lease a particular item. U.C.C.C.
§ 5.103(1) (1974).. For these loans, the UCCC provides that there is no deficiency when the
seller repossesses or accepts surrender of the goods if the cash sale price was $1750 or less.
Id. at § 5.103(2)(3). Using the inflator selected under UCCC § 5.103(8), $1750 in January
1967 dollars would be $7777 in January 1994 dollars. The UCCC calls for adjustments to
be made using the changes in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for Urban Wage Earners
and Clerical Workers: U.S. City Average, All Items, 1967 = 100; comparison between 1967
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and adopted in the three- to five-year period.following 1997. This
means that the drafting committee is now writing proposed legislation
that many states may not enact until the year 2000. By that time the
last revision of Article 9, the 1974 revision, will have lasted approxi-
mately 25 years. The drafting committee must determine how to draft
a new Article 9 that will last for a similar period of time. Any dollar
ceiling on antideficiency protection that is based on current average
deficiencies will become quickly and thoroughly out of date. Selecting
a dollar ceiling that is high enough to include all consumer transac-
tions, except the clearly luxury transactions, could minimize this
problem. 4
Consumer credit counselors have told this Author the average de-
ficiency that they now see is commonly $2000 to $4000. These defi-
ciencies arise from original debts of approximately $7000 to $9000.
Others have reported higher deficiencies. The deficiency amount
seems to be driven not by absolutes, but rather by the price of a car.55
Contrary to what some have suggested, deficiency issues seem to arise
just as frequently with respect to new cars as they do with used cars.
Thus, a ban on deficiencies of $5000 or $7500 would not remain useful
for long, even at today's historically low inflation rates. Assuming a
continuation of the low inflation rate experienced the last ten years
and a correspondingly low increase in the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), which excludes the historically high inflation rates of the late
1970s and early 1980s, a $5000 figure selected in 1994 would be worth
only $1944 in 1994 dollars by the year 2020.56 A $7500 figure would
and 1994 was made using CPI, All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average, All Items, 1982-
84 = 100. Id. § 5.103.
For an antideficiency standard using this approach to be effective today, it would have
to recognize and accommodate the startling increase in the price of one of the most fre-
quently financed consumer goods-the automobile. In 1967, when the UCCC drafters se-
lected a sale price of less than $1750 as the "no-deficiency" cutoff, the average price of a
new domestic car was $3310. In 1993, the average price of a new domestic car was $17,263.
54. The California Legislature apparently chose such an approach to dollar ceilings
that it was using in connection with a different issue when it amended California Commer-
cial Code § 9-504 in 1990. CAL_ COM. CODE § 9-504 (West Supp. 1994). Under § 9-504, an
absolute bar rule applies to secured transactions entered into primarily for personal, fam-
ily, or household purposes where: (1) the collateral was consumer goods, and (2) the debt
immediately before the disposition was $100,000 or less. Id. § 9-504(2)(d)(i). The absolute
bar rule also applies to all other secured transactions, if the amount of the debt immedi-
ately before the disposition was $50,000 or less. Id. § 9-504(2)(d)(ii).
55. The original debts may be lower than the average price of new automobiles due to
the wide range of automobile prices, down payments, and the distorting effect of including
used cars as well as new cars in this average.
56. This calculation uses the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics
Consumer Price Index-All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average, All Items 1982-84 = 100.
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be worth only $2916 by the year 2020. Even if these revisions to Arti-
cle 9 were to last for a far shorter period than the current Article 9, a
low ceiling would still be significantly out of date just ten years after
being enacted. By the year 2010, for example, a $5000 number se-
lected today would be worth only $2796 in 1994 dollars. A $7500 fig-
ure would be worth only $4195 by the year 2010. These disparities
would be even more severe if inflation were to increase from its recent
low levels.
If a dollar ceiling approach is used, it becomes critical to tie the
ceiling to the amount of the deficiency before additional charges for
storage, reconditioning, repossession, attorneys fees, collection costs,
or other allowable expenses are added. The amount of these charges
are partially within the creditor's control. For example, the creditor
makes decisions about how much reconditioning to perform. Exclud-
ing charges within the creditor's control when determining whether
the amount of the deficiency falls within an antideficiency rule is the
only way to ensure that the threshold cannot be manipulated. If the
deficiency is greater than the threshold, those additional items could
be included to the extent otherwise permitted by Article 9 or other
law.
Another problem with selecting a relatively low amount as a trig-
ger for a consumer antideficiency rule is that it would not address a
major area of need: the consumer who buys and finances a mobile
home. In urban areas, mobile homes have very little resale value un-
less they are sold "in place" at a park in which the coach is entitled to
remain. Mobile home dealers and park owners who sell homes on
their own behalf are able to arrange for these preconditions to be met.
If the lender does not arrange for an in-place sale, a mobile home is
likely to bring a very small price relative to both its in-place value and
to the debt. The example from Southern California discussed earlier
illustrates this problem.5 7
This is the index recommended in the UCCC. This Author averaged the percent change in
the CPI from December of each year, 1984 through 1993. The average percentage increase
was 3.7%. Using the December 1993 index of 145.8, projections for December of each
year were made by increasing the index of the prior December by 3.7%. The projected
indexes are: (1) 151.20 in 1994; (2) 270.39 in 2010; and (3) 388.85 in 2020. To calculate the
percentage increase in consumer prices, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' formula was
used-((index-previbis index)/previous index)*100) = percent change. Conversion of the
value of ceiling amounts in future years to 1994 dollars was calculated using the following
formula: value in 1994 = (1/(1+ percent change)) (ceiling).
57. See supra part IV.A.
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Mobile homes are an important source of housing for working
class, elderly, and low-income Americans. Surely no one would argue
that a mobile home is a luxury item, although a vehicle that costs the
same amount today as a new mobile home might be a luxury item.
Thus, if a dollar amount approach is used, there should be an exemp-
tion for mobile homes, regardless of dollar amount. A simpler way to
avoid these problems would be to adopt an antideficiency rule for all
consumer goods, except certain well-defined luxury goods identified
by type.
The most serious and continuing problem which consumers have
faced under Article 9 is its utter failure to ensure that consumers re-
ceive a credit against their deficiency for the true fair market value of
repossessed or voluntarily-surrendered goods. The Article 9 Drafting
Committee and the NCCUSL now have an extraordinary opportunity
to resolve this serious and continuing problem. This opportunity
should not be missed.
V. BASELINE STANDARDS FROM THE UNIFORM CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE FOR SECURED CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS
The drafters of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) ap-
propriately recognized that the baseline rules for consumer credit
transactions should differ from those for commercial transactions. A
new Article 9 that will be fair when applied to both commercial and
consumer transactions should include some of the principles from the
UCCC. These principles include: (1) an unconscionability provision
such as UCCC section 5.108 and UCC section 2A-108; (2) a restriction
on attorneys fees clauses running against consumers as is found in
UCCC section 2.507; (3) a requirement for notice and a right to cure
similar to UCCC sections 5.110 and 5.111; and (4) a requirement for
adequate allegations in the event of a deficiency action such as UCCC
section 5.114(1) and (2).58
58. U.C.C.C. § 5.103 (1974). There are a wide variety of other provisions in the UCCC
that this Author, and probably many other consumer advocates, would like to see in Arti-
cle 9-including restrictions on maximum rates of interest. This Author's understanding of
the role that NCCUSL has undertaken is that it will not entertain any such proposals for
price regulation. Indeed, in earlier discussions with representatives of the Conference
about Articles 3 and 4, it was clear that many basic consumer protections were regarded by
participants in the Conference process as "regulatory," and therefore best left to other
areas of the law. However, leaving consumer issues to other law is politically unrealistic,
and in fact frequently means that those issues will not be addressed at all.
A revision of Article 9 is likely to have numerous provisions desired by creditors, and
thus certain political momentum. A separate proposed act or subchapter solely addressing
consumer issues will have no such momentum, and is highly unlikely to receive the same
November 1994]
212 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
In the UCCC's official text, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws recognizes that "adequate protection
of consumers from creditor practices and agreements that are abusive
or have a potential for abuse" is a "basic issue in the regulation of
consumer credit."59 Article 9 is one source of law governing con-
sumer credit, and it should contain provisions to prohibit and deter
abusivd practices.
A. An Unconscionability Standard for Article 9
The current Article 9 does not contain an express rule against
unconscionability. Unconscionable conduct in connection with the
disposition of collateral should fail any standard of commercial rea-
sonableness. There are, however, aspects to the secured transaction
other than the disposition of collateral. The evils of unconscionable
inducement, terms, and collection practices were recognized by the
Conference when it promulgated section 2A-108. An earlier prece-
dent is found in UCCC section 5.108.6o
The existence of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA)61 does not eliminate the need for an Article 9 prohibition
on unconscionability. The FDCPA only applies to the collection of
debt.62 The Act does not measure or address the conscionability of
conduct leading to the creation of a security interest, nor does it ad-
dress the inducements, if any, to provide the security interest. The
unconscionability in the inducement aspect could be particularly im-
portant for consumer guarantors and cosigners, because they fre-
quently lack a full understanding that they are obligating themselves
equally. and fully to the debt. Conduct that creates or fosters this be-
lief could well be unconscionable.
acceptance as will provisions addressing consumer credit transactions which are woven into
the fabric of the revised Article 9. For this reason, it is not appropriate to postpone con-
sumer-issues for separate treatment or to segregate all the consumer rules into one part of
the revised Article 9. Instead, the revision must evaluate how each of its new rules will
affect consumers and, where appropriate, modify the proposed rule to ensure it will oper-
ate fairly in consumer transactions.
59. U.C.C.C. prefatory note at XXII (1974).
60. The drafting committee for Article 2 has made a tentative decision to include the
inducement standard from § 2A-108 in Article 2. Although that drafting committee did
not adopt the unconscionable collection provisions from § 2A-108, such a provision seems
even more appropriate for Article 9. If the goods are financed, a prohibition on uncon-
scionable collectiori activity in Article 9 would make a similar provision in Article 2 unnec-
essary. If the goods are not financed, no. provision on collection activity is needed for
Article 2.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1988).
62. See id. § 1692(e).
[Vol. 28:191
MODEL DINOSAURS
The federal FDCPA also does not directly address the handling
or disposition of the security, although a party could try to raise these
issues under the FDCPA's general provisions for disputing the amount
owed. 63 The FDCPA also does not reach in-house collectors or their
conduct.' 4 Additionally, not all states have debt collection acts,6' and
even in those states that do, some acts fail to cover in-house
collectors.66
One concern that might be raised about an Article 9 prohibition
on unconscionable collection conduct is the selection of an appropri-
ate remedy. Apparently, the Article 2 Drafting Committee was moti-
vated by this concern when it declined to adopt the unconscionable
collection activity portion of section 2A-108. The Consumer Advo-
cacy Committee of the Legal Services Section of the California State
Bar has suggested a cure for concerns about open-ended remedies for
unconscionable collection activity. It suggests that "the remedy for
unconscionable collection conduct should be the creditor's forfeiture
of the payment(s) and/or interest collected by virtue of the uncon-
scionable conduct. 67
The unconscionability provisions of both section 2A-108 and
UCCC section 5-108 provide for attorneys fees to be awarded to a
prevailing consumer. A consumer may suffer an adverse fee award
only if for bringing or maintaining an action that he or she knew to be
groundless. This provision should be included in any Article 9 uncon-
scionability provision in order to encourage and assist consumers to
enforce the act's requirements.6
B. Restriction of Amounts Awardable Under Attorneys Fees Clauses
in Favor of Creditors
UCCC section 2.507 contains two alternative methods for re-
stricting attorneys fee clauses running against consumers in credit
63. See id. §§ 1692e(2), 1692g(a).
64. See iad §§ 1692a(6), 1692, 1692b-1692i, 1692k.
65. See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 651, app. L (2d ed.
1991 & Supp. 1993).
66. Id.; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-6901 to -6902 (Harrison 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 111, para. 2001 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 25-11-1-1 to -13 (Bums 1991 &
Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:18-1 to -6.1 (West 1978); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-213
(Michie 1988).
67. Memorandum from the Consumer Advocacy Committee, Legal Services Section,
State Bar of California, to Larry Doyle, Office of Governmental Affairs, State Bar of Cali-
fornia 2 (Nov. 3, 1993) (on file with author).
68. For a discussion of the need for consumer attorneys fees provisions in connection
with Article 2, see supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
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agreements. Alternative A is a flat prohibition on a contractual clause
providing for the consumer to pay the creditor's attorneys fees. Alter-
native B permits attorneys fees clauses in most consumer loans, but
provides generally that the fees may not exceed 15% of the unpaid
debt after default. It also limits attorneys fees to fees for outside at-
torneys, not those employed by the creditor.69
Alternative B presents a very useful default rule for Article 9. It
could operate in those states which have not adopted either a prohibi-
tion or stricter restriction on creditor attorneys fee clauses. If such a
provision were added to Article 9, it could simply state:
With respect to a transaction with consumer goods or
intangibles as collateral and a consumer borrower or a con-
sumer guarantor, the security agreement may not provide for
payment by the consumer or consumer guarantor of attor-
neys fees in excess of 15% of the unpaid debt after default
and disposition of collateral. The agreement may not pro-
vide for payment of attorneys fees not actually incurred, or
which are paid to an attorney who is a salaried employee of
the creditor, and may not provide for payment of any attor-
neys fees other than those which are both reasonable and
consistent with this limitation. A provision in violation of
this section is unenforceable.70
On the general issue of attorneys fees, Article 9 should also provide
for attorneys fees in favor of prevailing consumers, as a means to en-
courage compliance with its substantive requirements. 71
C. Notice and a Right to Cure
Another pair of useful provisions are UCCC sections 5.110 and
5.111. These sections provide for notice and a right to cure before
69. Alternative B also includes a prohibition on attorneys fees for closed-end credit
with a cost of more than 18% per year and an amount financed of $1000 or less. A CPI
adjustment on this amount from January 1967 to January 1994 would yield a new bench-
mark loan amount of $4443.80, in 1994 dollars. Given the reluctance to become involved
in pricing issues shown by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in connection with recently revised Articles 3 and 4, it seems unlikely that a proposal
to prohibit attorneys fees against a consumer based upon the terms of the loan would be
well received by the Conference. Therefore, adoption of this portion of Alternative B is
not recommended here.
70. This language is based on, but not identical to, Alternative B(2) of UCCC § 2.507.
71. The drafting committee discussed this issue at its March 1994 meeting in Boston,
voting to permit prevailing consumers to recover attorneys fees. The draft, however, pres-
ently takes a different approach. Reasons for such a provision are discussed in connection
with Article 2. See supra part II.B.2.
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repossession. The notice may be given whenever the consumer is ten
days late, and it must inform the consumer of the last date upon which
the payment can be made in order to allow the consumer to continue
paying on the contract. Section 5.111 works with the notice of right to
cure by setting forth the actual right to cure. The right to cure reaches
only failure to pay. It does not extend to other types of defaults.
The comments to section 5.110 explain that the purpose of the
notice of the right to cure is to "give the consumer enough informa-
tion to understand his predicament and to encourage him to take ap-
propriate steps to alleviate it."'7 It is further designed to prevent "the
practice of some unscrupulous creditors who repossess collateral when
a payment is only a day or two late."573 The comments go on to ex-
plain that the notice gives the average consumer the opportunity to
rehabilitate the account, to resolve a billing error, to present a breach
of warranty claim, or to negotiate a refinancing or deferral arrange-
ment if needed. These same reasons that made a notice of time to
cure and right to cure a good idea twenty years ago are still present
today.
D. Requirement for Adequate Notice of the Manner of Calculating
a Deficiency at or Before Attempts to Collect It
Some creditors simply demand that the consumer pay a defi-
ciency without disclosing how much was paid at the sale or credited to
the debt. Indeed, this Author has reviewed demands for payment of
deficiency in which the lender simply states that it "disposed of the
vehicle and incurred a loss" of the amount of the claimed deficiency.
Such lack of detail makes it very difficult for a consumer to know if he
or she can or should dispute the commercial reasonableness of the
disposition. If the consumer does not know how much was paid at the
post-repossession or post-surrender sale, there is no way of knowing
whether the amount being sought by the creditor as a-deficiency is fair
and correct. There may have been no litigation in which the consumer
could learn of the calculation that led to the amount of deficiency
claimed. Consumer credit counselors in California have told this Au-
thor that they see many creditors attempting to collect deficiencies in
the thousands of dollars through in-house or outside collectors, rather
than through litigation. UCCC section 5.114 requires that, in an action
brought by a creditor against a consumer, the complaint must allege
72. U.C.C.C. § 5.110 cmt. 1 (1974).
73. Id cmt. 3.
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the facts of the consumer's default, the amount to which the consumer
is entitled, and "an indication of how that amount was determined." 74
An Article 9 provision could incorporate this notice concept by re-
quiring that any demand for, notice of, or request for payment of a
deficiency, whether or not in connection with litigation, provide the
consumer with at least the following basic facts:
1. the date of and amount paid at any sale or other disposi-
tion of the collateral;
2. the amount credited against the consumer debt as a re-
sult of disposition of the collateral;
3. the amount of each post-default fee or charge by amount
and type, including repossession charges claimed, storage
charges, and any expenses claimed for reconditioning or re-
habilitating the collateral;
4. the amount of any rebates of prepaid charges, such as
prepaid finance charges, insurance premiums, or service con-
tracts, credited to the debtor;
5. basic facts about the original debt such as amount of
debt, principal, interest, and other charges;
6. the amount of any deficiency or surplus; and
7. the name and phone number to call for more informa-
tion or to discuss the calculations. 75
This type of notice would give consumers who are faced with efforts to
collect a deficiency an opportunity to learn how the claimed deficiency
was calculated. Consumers, or their attorneys or lay advocates, could
use the notice to determine whether all prepaid charges, including
prepaid finance charges and prepaid credit insurance, were properly
rebated and credited against the debt. The requirement to disclose
the amount paid at the sale and credited on the debt also would help
74. The UCCC also requires verification or sworn testimony before entry of a default
judgment. U.C.C.C. § 5.114(2) (1974). The Article 9 Drafting Committee, however, has
shown a great reluctance to adopt burden of proof related standards, preferring to leave
that to state law. Discussion Draft, Feb. 8, 1994, supra note 18, § 9-505 (reporter's explan-
atory notes).
75. A proposal for a required notice of deficiency along these lines has been made to
the chair of the drafting committee and reporters by David McMahon, a legal services
attorney from West Virginia. McMahon suggests that the notice of the manner of calcula-
tion of the deficiency be given to the debtor: (1) before the first collection communication,
(2) with the first collection communication, or (3) with any other first collection action.
McMahon also suggests notice when there is a surplus or the consumer has paid more than
60% of the purchase price. Letter from David B. McMahon, West Virginia Legal Services
Plan, Inc., to William Burke, Drafting Committee Chair, Shearman & Sterling, Charles
Mooney, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania, and Steve Harris, Professor of
Law, University of Illinois (June 7, 1994) (on Me with author).
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to make a standard for measuring the adequacy of the disposition
more self-enforcing, because consumers would know how much was
credited from the sale.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although much work remains to be done, the Article 2 Drafting
Committee is examining the fairness of the rules it is proposing for
ordinary consumer transactions. Although there are still serious is-
sues for consumers in Article 2, the current Article 2 draft does at-
tempt to address some consumer problems. The drafters of Article 9
must do the same. They must wrestle with and resolve the long-stand-
ing and continuing problem that Article 9 allows creditors to pursue a
deficiency against a consumer who has not received a credit for the
fair value of items taken back by the creditor, as well as a host of
other important issues. The next twelve to twenty-four months should
reveal whether the Article 9 Drafting Committee and NCCUSL will
take the steps needed to truly modernize Article 9.
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